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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Supreme Court in the past has allowed the equal division rule in collision cases
despite a statute limiting the liability of one of the negligent parties. See The
Chattahoochee, supra; The Harter Act, 27 Stat. 445, 446 U. S. C. Sec. 190-195.
As the Court said inThe Tampico, supra "in reason and principle collision cases
point the way." justice Holmes, confronted with a similar argument that an
expansion in admiralty law should be left to the Congress replied: "It would be
a mere historical anomaly if admiralty courts were not free to work out their
own systems and to finish the adjustment of maritime rights and liabilities." Erie
Ry. Co. v. Erie TransportationCo., 204 U. S.220, 225 (1907).
Daniel T. Roach
EVIDENCE-WIRE RECORDINGS OF CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS
BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE HELD INADMISSABLE
The plaintiff had induced his son to make a wire recording of an argument
between plaintiff and his wife while they were alone in their common bedroom.
Held: Admission of the recording in divorce proceedings brought by plaintiff
against his wife was error because the status of the parties and the confidential
nature of the communication made it privileged, Hunter v. Hunter 169 Pa. Super.
498,83 A (2d) 401 (1951).
Although the absolute common law prohibition, Davis v Dinwoody 4T.R.
678, 100 Eng.Rep. 1241 (1792), against the use of testimony of one spouse in
the cause of the other, whether it be hostile or helpful, has been to a large extent
abrogated inthis country by statute, New York Civil Practice Act §346, 28 Purdon's Pa. Stats. §317, and by decisional law, Funk -v.
U. S.290 U. S.371 (1933),
the privilege attached to confidential communications between husband and wife
still persists, Wolfle v.U. S. 291 U. S.7 (1934), New York Civil Practice Act
§349, New York PenalLaw §2449, 28 Purdon'sPa. Stats. §316.
The privilege relates to either the written or spoken word but is applicable
only where the communication is confidential due to its nature, Seitz v. Seitz 170
Pa. 71, 32 Ad. 578 (1887), Parkhurst v. Berdell 110 N. Y. 386, 18 N. E. 123
(1888) and is made in the absence of third persons, People v. Lewis 62 Hun
622, 16 N. Y. Supp (Sup. Ct. 1st Dept. 1891).
The reason for the privilege is the preservation of conjugal unity. Therefore,
the privilege acts as a bar available only to one spouse against testimony by the
other, and does not prevent the admission into evidence of conversations overheard, Commonwealth v. Wakelin 230 Mass. 567, 120 N. E. 209 (1918), but
cf. Nash v.Fidelity Phoenix Fire Ins. Co. 106 W. Va. 672, 146 S.E. 726 (1929),
or letters intercepted by third parties, Cf. People v.Hayes, 140 N. Y. 484, 35 N.

RECENT DECISIONS
E. 951 (1894). Nevertheless, it has been maintained that due to the personal nature
of the privilege the spouse confided in should not be allowed to circumvent the
rule by acting in connivance with a third person so as to bring the conversations within the ambit of the "eavesdropper" exception to the privilege, 8 Wigmore On Evidence §2339 (3rd Ed. 1940), Richardson On Evidence §515 (7th
Ed. 1948). Despite the apparent validity of the arguments propounded by textwriters, many jurisdictions which have passed upon the question have held such
evidence admissable, McNeill v. State 117 Ark. 8, 173 S. W. 826 (1915), State
v. Bflffington 20 Kan. 599, 27 Am. Rep. 193 (1878). The reasoning of the court
in the principal case, to the effect that the plaintiff ought not to be allowed to
procure indirectly and through his agent an advantage not otherwise available to
him, would appear to be the preferred approach towards a rule of law which
has as its ultimate objective the strengthening of the marriage relationship by investing it with a bond of mutual trust and confidence between the spouses.
Gerard J. O'Brien
EQUITY-SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE BY PARTIAL SUB-PURCHASER
AGAINST ORIGINAL VENDOR
The New York, New Haven & Hartford Ry. Co. leased a parcel of real
property to Bronx-Whitestone Terminals, Inc. The lease contained an option to
purchase. Bronx contracted to convey a part of the leasehold to Geo. V. Clark
Co., and thereafter gave notice to the Railroad of its exercise of the option. Clark
tendered performance to Bronx, but Bronx refused to deliver a deed, on the
grounds that (1) it could not get title from the Railroad, and (2) that the title
was unmarketable. Clark sued for specific performance, joining Bronx and the
Railroad. A motion to dismiss, on the grounds that the complaint failed to state
a cause of action, was granted in favor of the defendant Railroad in the Supreme
Court, County of Bronx, where it was declared that a suit could not be brought
on a contract by a plaintiff who is neither a party nor privy to it. On appeal,
the order was reversed, Callahan J. stating that (1) . . . "although there is no
privity of contract between Clark and the Railroad, privity of estate exists, and
equities have arisen in favor of Clark entitling .him to specific performance of
the Bronx-Railroad contract, and his own contract of sub purchase .. ."; (2) "in
any event the complaint states a cause of action for specific performance against
Bronx,... and the Railroad is a necessary party to such suit to avoid circuity of
action .... " Van Voorhis, J., dissented. Geo. V. Clark Co., Inc. et. al. v. New
York, New Haven & Hartford Ry. Co. et. al.,
-App.
Div-, 107
N. Y. S. 2nd 721 ( 1st Dept. 1951).
Equity will entertain a cause of action for specific performance of an ex-

